The future of Europe, differentiated integration and Turkey's role by Müftüler-Baç, Meltem & Muftuler-Bac, Meltem
COMMENTARY 09 1October 2013
The future of Europe is tied to the process of integration in the European Union, and the Union’s ability to transform into a new type of a polity. The European Union is often 
defined as a sui generis organization that goes beyond an in-
tergovernmental organization but falls short of a classically-
defined state since it does not possess the critical elements of 
statehood. Whether the EU is seen as a “superstate”, “an intergo-
vernmental organization” or “a cosmopolitan union” depending 
on its degree of integration has important implications for the 
future of Europe.1  This degree of integration could be measu-
red through the schemes for cooperation and harmonization 
concluded by the EU member states. There seem to be diffe-
rences in this vision, as there are member states which envisage 
enhanced cooperation beyond the traditional Treaty structure, 
and member states which favor a strengthening of Commu-
nity structures. Nonetheless, the European project is about its 
members’ capacity to take the political initiative; this capacity, 
in turn, depends on the Union’s ability to reconcile integration 
and enlargement.2 It is, therefore, clear that further enlarging 
the Union is tied to the Union’s integrative path.
We therefore need to take into account the possible trajectories 
of Europe to understand the conditions under which 
enlargement would be likely. There are three different trajectories 
for the future of the Union. In one possible future scenario, the 
EU could evolve into a federal multinational and supranational 
state, which seems unlikely at the moment. In the second 
scenario, the EU would remain largely intergovernmental, with 
member states’ cooperating on some key policies such as trade 
and economic integration, but remaining largely independent 
on other policies. The third possible scenario involves a “core 
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group” of EU members transferring competencies to the 
supranational polity, while others pick and choose among 
common policies, leading to “differentiated integration”. In this 
trajectory, the EU acquires “a single organizational and member 
state core, and a territorial outreach that varies by function as a 
system of differentiated integration.” 3
These different trajectories of European integration are all 
connected to the evolution of policy-making within the EU, as 
well as to the political will of its member states to deal with 
the multiple crisis which the EU is undergoing and which is 
complicating its finalité politique.4  This finalité politique goes 
hand-in-hand with the EU’s enlargement process, and is tied to 
the overarching question “where does Europe begin and end?”
The future of the European Union in terms of its final frontiers 
and the political structure it will acquire lies at the epicenter of 
European public debate. The outcome of this debate will be 
particularly telling in terms of the future enlargement of the EU. 
The EU’s enlargement policy could be seen as a key instrument 
for advancing the EU’s foreign policy goals, such as uniting 
the European continent, securing the EU’s borders, expanding 
the EU’s global reach and enhancing security in Europe. 
According to the European Commission, “the EU has, since 
its inception, responded to the legitimate aspiration of the 
peoples of our continent to be united in a common European 
endeavour. It has brought nations and cultures together, 
enriching and injecting the EU with diversity and dynamism. 
More than three quarters of the EU Member States are former 
“enlargement” countries.”5  An important concern here is how 
the natural limits of enlargement impact on the EU’s cohesion, 
sustainability, prosperity, institutional capacity and democratic 
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in a union of 29 members, including itself, Turkey would have 
the largest group of European parliamentarians, and Turkish 
voting weight in the Council would be substantial under the 
double majority rules. To take the example of the European 
Parliament (EP), Turkey would have around 96 members – the 
maximum allowed under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty – as the 
Parliament will have a maximum of 751 members – 750 MEPs 
and a President from 2014 onwards. Since the maximum size of 
the EP is unlikely to change at the moment given the limitations 
of physical space, this would mean that, were Turkey to accede, 
other members would have to give up seats in order to make 
room for the Turkish delegation. While not only Germany would 
lose seats in this way, for Germany an additional loss would be 
to lose its primary position as the most populous member of the 
EU. Turkey’s accession to the EU would also change the balance 
in the Council of Ministers under double majority voting. As 
the largest EU member, Turkey would have the greatest voting 
power, and would effectively act as a veto player in most EU 
legislation. This brings us to the argument that the EU’s ability 
to function would be seriously hampered with the inclusion of 
another large country such as Turkey. Simply put, institutional 
gridlock might become harder to manage. So, is a form of 
membership other than accession possible?
This might be what the EU had in mind when it adopted 
the new “Positive Agenda” with Turkey on 17 May 2012. The 
Positive Agenda targets increased dialogue and harmonization 
between Turkey and the EU on the Schengen regime, enhanced 
cooperation on energy issues, foreign policy, and the fight 
against terrorism, and increased participation in people-to-
people programs, all mutually beneficial targets for both parties. 
The adoption of the Positive Agenda seems to indicate that, 
even in the absence of full membership, Turkey’s integration in 
the EU could be possible in multiple new policy areas, clearly 
indicating a path of differentiated integration with Turkey. To 
put it concretely, a path of differentiated integration with Turkey 
would include increased harmonization with regards to the 
single market, extension of free trade arrangements on textiles 
and agriculture, and increased cooperation in the financial 
sector, in other words a deepening of the 1995 customs union 
agreement. Similarly, increased cooperation between Turkey 
and the EU on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
– which is already substantial, with Turkish participation in 
almost all EU-led operations – would be necessary. This would 
involve Turkey’s membership in the European Defence Agency 
and the participation of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
the relevant Council meetings. Increased Turkish involvement 
in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) without 
formal membership would be a clear indication of differentiated 
integration as the EU’s future trajectory. 
representation. In other words, the extent to which the EU can 
continue enlarging without jeopardizing its integration process 
becomes critical. This is also partly the reason why some EU 
member states are more hesitant both towards enlargement 
and towards the accession of specific countries. Then French 
President Nicholas Sarkozy reflected on this in 2011 as follows: 
“one cannot plead for federalism and at the same time for the 
enlargement of Europe. It’s impossible. There’s a contradiction.”6
Turkey and differentiated integration
Among the current candidate countries, one deserves special 
mention as a result of its possible impact on the future of 
Europe: Turkey. Turkey has been negotiating EU accession since 
2005 with relatively little progress. Turkey has been part of the 
European political order since the end of World War II with its 
membership of the Council of Europe (1949), Organization for 
Economic Cooperation (1948) and NATO (1952). Under its 1963 
Association Agreement with the then EC, Turkey was legally 
eligible for accession; it signed a Customs Union Agreement 
with the EU in 1995, and was declared a candidate for EU 
membership officially in 1999. As a result, it has a significant level 
of integration in multiple European policies. It is an integral part 
of European security and defence, while the customs union for 
industrial products has meant that Turkey has harmonized its 
laws with the EU customs union acquis. Turkey’s accession to 
the EU has material benefits for the EU in terms of its economic 
size and its security role. As regards its economic size, according 
to the World Bank, Turkey is the 15th largest economy in the 
world, and 6th largest in Europe.7  In terms of its military power, 
it is ranked as the 11th largest military power in the world in 
the Global Firepower index.8  It is clear from these figures that 
Turkey’s integration into EU markets and European security 
would be to the EU’s advantage, especially in an increasingly 
multipolar world – but the pressing question is what kind of 
integration.
Turkey’s accession to the EU goes beyond the rather simplistic 
analysis of whether Turkey meets the EU’s accession criteria – 
though it is absolutely necessary that it does – and is tied to 
the debates on the future of Europe. Thus, a public debate on 
Turkish accession needs to touch upon the possible impact 
that Turkey would have on the European integration process. 
Two factors come into the forefront here: the size of the Turkish 
population, and its perceived cultural differences from the 
current EU member states. 
Turkey has a large population – around 78 million – and would 
be 2nd largest member after Germany if it became a member 
today. What is even more striking is that Turkey’s population is 
predicted to increase to around 95 million by 2030, whereas 
Germany’s is projected to decrease to 78 million.9  
Since the EU decision-making structures are heavily influenced 
by population numbers, Turkish membership would mean that 
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The integration process, i.e. the adoption of common rules 
and procedures, as well as common positions on key foreign 
policy issues, requires a consensus-building mechanism and 
the mobilisation of like-minded states around common goals 
and common denominators. The inclusion of an institutionally 
powerful, yet most probably not like-minded, Turkey in this 
process might hamper the likelihood of common positions. 
This is not to say that all EU members converge around the 
same ideas, the very presence of the United Kingdom being a 
case in point. However, if the future path of integration is one of 
federalism, Turkish membership might slow down the process. 
Alternatively, Turkish membership could be a blessing in 
disguise. The evolution of the EU towards a path of differentiated 
integration, with a new type of membership for Turkey, could 
provide the Union with further opportunities to deepen 
integration, with different policies being adopted by different 
member states. As long as all member states agree to a policy 
or a decision in principle, while also not requiring all member 
states to adopt it immediately, greater flexibility in common 
decisions could be possible. 
This means that the very process of differentiated integration 
might lead to a situation where the “classical” forms of 
membership no longer are needed. As other European Union 
members have chosen to do, Turkey might adopt the EU acquis 
on key policies such as energy, transport, the common market 
or common security and defence, but remain outside of the EU 
framework for the Social Charter, or the Schengen regime. If the 
path of integration is differentiation, then full membership is 
not necessary in order to participate in it. If Turkey becomes one 
of the first examples of such a scheme, the future of European 
integration would also drastically change, transforming the EU 
into a new blend of an organizational core, and a system of 
functionally differentiated units. 
